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Abstract—Demand for scalable hardware verification is ever-
increasing. We propose an unbounded safety verification frame-
work for hardware, at the heart of which is a software verifier.
To this end, we synthesize Verilog at register transfer level into
a software-netlist, represented as a word-level ANSI-C program.
The proposed tool flow allows us to leverage the precision and
scalability of state-of-the-art software verification techniques. In
particular, we evaluate unbounded proof techniques, such as
predicate abstraction, k-induction, interpolation, and IC3/PDR;
and we compare the performance of verification tools from the
hardware and software domains that use these techniques. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to perform
unbounded verification of hardware using software analyzers.
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
With the ever-increasing complexity of hardware and SoC-
based designs for mobile platforms, demand for scalable
formal verification tools in the hardware industry is always
growing. The scalability of hardware model checking tools
depends on three key factors: the design representation, the
verification engine, and the proof engine. This paper experi-
mentally evaluates the influence of the first two factors: the
design representation, and the verification engine. Figure 1
shows the phases that a typical hardware model checking tool
passes through.
Design representation: Given a hardware design in Verilog
RTL, formal verification tools use different internal represen-
tations for the design, at differing levels of design granularity:
bit level, word level, term level or software level. Figure 1
lists some of the design representations commonly used. Most
formal verification tools for hardware [4], [6], [7] synthesize
the input design into a bit-level netlist, typically represented as
AIG, and stored in formats such as BLIF, EDIF, PLA or BAF.
This approach misses the opportunity to exploit the word-level
structure of the input RTL design. Tools based on word-level
representations may use BTOR or another intermediate word-
level format, which enables the use of word-level decision pro-
cedures, such as Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers,
in the back-end of these tools.
The Verification Engine: Over the past few years, we
have seen that verification tools participating in Hardware
Model Checking Competition (HWMCC) employ a variety
of verification engines to speed up proofs or to detect deep
bugs. After McMillan’s notable work on interpolation-based
model checking [19], the work of Bradley [4] on incremental
inductive invariant generation (IC3) proved to be a paradigm
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Fig. 1. Conventional flow for hardware property verification
shift in scaling bit-level hardware verification. The success
of IC3 is its ability to perform unbounded verification as
well as quickly detect deep bugs based on relative induction
strengthening. IC3 or Property Directed Reachability (PDR),
k-induction, and interpolation-based approaches have all made
their way from the hardware to the software domain; but
predicate abstraction and abstract interpretation have remained
primarily used for software verification.
The use of high-level structures as a design description for
model checking is a holy grail of hardware verification [8],
[9], [14], [15], [20], [22]. The efficiency and scalability of
the verification engine depends on the granularity of design
descriptions as well as the decision procedures used. This is
exemplified by the scalability of word-level hardware verifica-
tion [16], [22], tools such as word-level STE [8], BMC [2],
[20], predicate abstraction [14] and interpolation [17] over
the corresponding bit-level implementations. Recent work de-
scribed in [10], [24] generalizes PDR to richer logics such
as QF BV and the software domain—and demonstrates better
scalability than bit-level PDR.
In this paper, we present a novel unbounded safety verifi-
cation tool flow for hardware. Unlike traditional approaches
that synthesize the design into a bit-level netlist [4], [6],
[7] or generate an abstract model of the design (say C/C++
ISA or micro-architectural models derived from RTL [9]), we
propose an orthogonal approach for hardware verification using
software verifiers. To this end, we automatically synthesize
the hardware models, articulated in Verilog at register transfer
level, into a software-netlist, represented as word-level ANSI-
C program. The generated model is bit precise and cycle
accurate, but expressed as a software program. This opens
the door to exploiting the full range of unbounded software
verification techniques in a common framework.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we report the following contributions:
1) Unbounded Hardware Verification using Software Ana-
lyzers: We present an unbounded safety verification tool
flow for hardware IPs using software analyzers. To this
end, we perform automatic synthesis of Verilog RTL into
a software-netlist.
2) Unified and Integrated Framework: One advantage of the
proposed tool flow is that it provides a unified framework
to evaluate various unbounded verification techniques at
the bit level, word level, and software level. This enables
us to compare model checking tools from the Hardware
Model Checking Competition (HWMCC)1 with tools
from the Software Verification Competition (SV-COMP)2.
3) Benchmarking: Although SoC designs are increasingly
written at a higher level [15], [18], there is still a signifi-
cant body of existing design IP blocks that are written in
VHDL or Verilog. The proposed tool flow allows rapid
generation of software-netlist models from hardware IP
derived from real-world hardware benchmark suites.
III. UNBOUNDED HARDWARE VERIFICATION
A. Generating Software-Netlist from Verilog
Given a hardware design in Verilog RTL, our tool v2c [20]
synthesizes the design into a software-netlist model in C. Each
state transition in hardware can be viewed as set of register
updates according to the next-state function and assignment of
non-deterministic values to the external inputs. In the software-
netlist, the state transition is also achieved by updating the
sequential or state-holding elements and explicit assignment
of non-deterministic values to the input signals. The software-
netlist model retains the module hierarchy of Verilog RTL.
Thus, each clock step in hardware is simulated by a call to
the top-level function in the software-netlist. Due to space
limitations, we only briefly explain the translation here and
refer the reader to v2c for more details.3
B. Cycle-accurate and bit-precise translation
v2c translates Verilog RTL to a cycle-accurate and bit-
precise model in C. Due to the sequential nature of the
software-netlist model, the tool performs intra-modular and
inter-modular dependency analysis between the clocked blocks
containing procedural statements (blocking or non-blocking)
and the continuous assignment statements. The generated C
code conforms to the synthesis semantics of Verilog RTL.
1http://fmv.jku.at/hwmcc14cav/
2http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2015/index.php
3http://www.cprover.org/hardware/v2c
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Fig. 2. Tool flow for hardware property verification
Verilog has few operators—such as part-select, bit-select from
vectors, concatenation, reduction—that are not available na-
tively in C. v2c translates these to semantically-equivalent C
expressions using an appropriate combination of C operators.
It is straightforward to generate a software-netlist model
for circuits without feedback loops. However, for designs with
loops, there are two possible ways to synthesize a word-
level software-netlist model. The first approach is to create a
flattened software-netlist model by decomposing the module
hierarchy, in a way similar to how a word-level transition
system would be synthesized. An alternative is to retain the
modular structure by analyzing the conditions under which
signal values in combinatorial logic reach fixed-points. We
aim to take the second approach, since it retains the word-
level structure as well as the module hierarchy of the Verilog
RTL. Currently, however, v2c does not handle combinational
loops, transparent latches and designs with multiple clocks.
C. Equivalence of Verilog and Software-netlist
In order to obtain a trustworthy translation, we refrain from
doing synthesis-based optimization and abstraction during the
translation of Verilog RTL to a software-netlist. While we do
not have formal evidence that our translator is correct, we have
not observed any mistranslations during our experiments with
various control and data-dominated benchmarks. On the unsafe
benchmarks, the bug is manifested in the same clock cycle for
both models; on the safe benchmarks, the properties are proven
to be k-inductive with the same value of k for both models.
D. Software Verifiers at the heart of Hardware Verification
Figure 2 shows the tool flow for performing hardware
verification at bit-level, word-level, and software-level. We
use ABC to perform bit-level unbounded safety verification.
ABC does not support Verilog, so we use an open-source
synthesis tool, YOSYS 0.54 to translate Verilog RTL to BLIF,
which is then passed to ABC for verification. For word-level
unbounded verification, we use word-level k-induction engine
of EBMC, which supports IEEE 1364.1 Verilog 2005. For
the software-netlist verification flow, we use our tool v2c to
generate a software-netlist model from Verilog. We then apply
a wide range of representative unbounded software verification
techniques to determine the safety of these benchmarks. In
particular, we use k-induction [21] (implemented in the tools
CBMC [11] and 2LS [5]), interpolation (CPAChecker [1],
IMPARA [23] implementing the IMPACT algorithm [19]), ab-
stract interpretation (Astr´ee [3]) and IC3/PDR (SeaHorn [13]).
4http://www.clifford.at/yosys/
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we report experimental results for un-
bounded safety verification of hardware circuits at various
levels of design granularity, as shown in Figure 2. We compare
state-of-the-art hardware model checking tools, such as ABC
1.01 (winner of HWMCC 2014 in safety track) and EBMC 4.2,
with various software analyzers from SV-COMP 2015, such as
CPAChecker 1.4, SeaHorn (revision 07666c810d), 2LS 0.3.4
and a classical abstract interpretation based tool like Astre´e.
Our experiments were performed on an Intel Xeon machine
running at 3.07GHz. We restricted the resources to 5 hours and
32GB RAM per benchmark. To enable other researchers to
reproduce our results, all our benchmarks in Verilog, software-
netlist models in ANSI-C, scripts for running YOSYS 0.5,
ABC, EBMC 4.2, and other software verification tools are
uploaded to a publicly accessible archive website.5
Benchmarks: We target two different classes of circuits:
data-path intensive circuits, including a Huffman encoder/de-
coder and a Digital Audio Input-Output chip (DAIO); and
control-intensive designs, including a non-pipelined 3-stage
processor, a Read-Copy-update mutual exclusion protocol, a
FIFO controller, a buffer allocation model, and an instruction
queue controller. The safety properties are specified as System
Verilog assertions (SVA). The properties are instrumented as
assertions in the software-netlist model. The benchmarks in our
paper are derived from real world hardware benchmark suites,
including VIS Verilog models, the Texas-97 Benchmark suite,
and opencores.org.
Discussion: Figures 3–5 report the comparison of various
unbounded verification techniques employed by verification
tools at bit-level, word-level, and software-level. We categorize
the approaches into three classes:
• k-induction (Figure 3)
• interpolation (Figure 4), and
• PDR together with other hybrid techniques (Figure 5).
By hybrid techniques, we refer to predicate abstraction as
implemented in CPAChecker and a combination of k-induction,
BMC and abstract interpretation as implemented in 2LS [5].
On the x-axis is the analysis time in seconds and on the y-axis
we list the benchmarks. The vertical red lines on the right-
hand side of the diagrams show timeouts, out of memory,
inconclusive (unknown) results, errors (crashes), and wrong
results (tool bugs) reported by the tools. The tools can be
distinguished by the size of the circles as well as by colour.
Analysis using k-induction: For safe benchmarks, the re-
sults for bit-level, word-level verifiers and software verifiers
are comparable when the properties are 1-inductive or 2-step
inductive. However, for complex safety properties, ABC and
other abstraction based software analyzers either timeout or
took a long time to terminate. We investigated the reason
for higher verification times for some safe benchmarks, such
as the FIFO controller, the RCU, and Buffer Allocation. We
observe that the properties are not k-inductive for sufficiently
large values of k, e.g. (k=1000) and thus tools based on k-
induction either timeout or took long time to compute the
inductive invariant sufficient to prove the property. For the
5http://www.cprover.org/hardware/date2016/
unsafe benchmarks, for example DAIO and the traffic light
controller, where the bugs are manifested only at 64 and 65
clock cycles respectively, the verification times using ABC
and EBMC’s k-induction engine are comparable to CBMC 5.2
and 2LS. Figure 3 reports the time taken by the k-induction
engine in ABC, EBMC 4.2, CBMC 5.2 and 2LS. We did not
report the time for CPAChecker since the results suggest that
its k-induction engine is not as mature yet.
Analysis using Interpolation: Figure 4 reports the time
taken by the interpolation engine in ABC, IMPARA and
CPAChecker. ABC is the fastest in 9 out of 12 designs.
However, it times out on three complex benchmarks, RCU,
FIFO and BufAl, whereas the software interpolation tool,
IMPARA, which implements IMPACT algorithm solved three
instances out of which one is the complex FIFO design; yet
IMPARA either timed out or ran out of memory for the
remaining designs. CPAChecker solved 5 out of 12 cases. None
of the interpolation engines was able to prove RCU and BufAl.
Analysis using Hybrid techniques: Figure 5 reports the
time taken by the IC3/PDR engine in ABC, SeaHorn and other
hybrid techniques as implemented in CPAChecker and 2LS.
ABC is the clear winner here; it is the only tool that proves
the FIFO and BufAl benchmarks safe within the given 5h
timeout. SeaHorn’s PDR engine solves half of the benchmarks,
but produces false negatives on the other half due to limited
support for bitvectors. 2LS successfully solved 8 benchmarks
and times out on four benchmarks. CPAChecker’s predicate
abstraction reliably solves 7 benchmarks, but times out on
two benchmarks and reports three wrong results. Note that
none of the tools was able to prove RCU. We do not report
the results using Astre´e since it requires manual directives for
data and control partitioning to avoid imprecision; nonetheless
it generates many false alarms for safe benchmarks.
Summary of the results: We investigated the reason for
large number of timeouts, wrong results and errors produced
by the software verifiers. We observed that software-netlists
heavily use bit-level operations and thus bit-precise reasoning
ability is necessary for the underlying verification engine.
However, bit-level operations are less prevalent in conventional
software and hence less tested in software analysis tools. Also,
software verification tools often use numerical abstractions,
which are likely to lose important bit-precise information. As
a consequence, our results show that running conventional
sotware verification tools on software-netlists exhibits many
tool bugs (“wrong”).
The abstraction and invariant inference techniques em-
ployed in software tools such as CPAChecker and 2LS have
never been optimized for hardware analysis. But the results
in this paper show that these tools are within one order of
magnitude compared to hardware model checkers for detect-
ing bugs or proving safety for some of the software netlist
models. We thus believe that there is scope here for new tools
that implement abstract interpretation using abstract domains
developed specifically for this task, e.g. by applying abstract
conflict driven learning [12].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We present an approach to unbounded safety verification
for hardware designs given in Verilog RTL, at the heart
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of which are software verifiers. We present a comparison
of unbounded verification techniques at bit-level, word-level
and software-netlist level. The range of software verification
techniques is vast; this paper can thus only be an initial
step. We will evaluate further software verification techniques
and their application to hardware property checking and co-
verification workloads as future work.
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